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**EXPLORING THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS  
OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN NORTHERN  
MOZAMBIQUE IN 2021**

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## EXPLORING THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE IN 2021<sup>1</sup>

João Feijó, Jerry Maquenzi, Daniela Salite e Joshua Kirshner

### SUMMARY

The text aims to assess the socio-economic conditions of IDPs during the year 2021. Based on questionnaire surveys and field observation, it is observed that the armed conflict has had a negative impact on social relations in the North of Cabo Delgado, **affecting different social groups. The data reveals a significant worsening** in housing conditions, access to natural resources and conditions of production, making the population largely dependent on humanitarian aid. The high concentration of displaced populations along the Pemba-Montepuez axis has ensured greater proximity to public infrastructure and services, increasing demand on already highly saturated services. The war, forced displacement and the COVID-19 prevention measures had a negative impact on education services, affecting hundreds of thousands of young people and compromising the socio-professional integration of an entire generation.

The displacement of populations reflected the existing social inequalities in the province. Families with greater social or financial capital (including small entrepreneurs, civil servants or pensioners) were able to sponsor the relocation of the extended family to southern areas, as well as access to agricultural land. The population with fewer resources concentrated in the most insecure areas or in temporary, highly densified centres, with greater difficulty of access to natural resources and more dependent on humanitarian aid. In the north of the province the populations remained restricted in their access to public services and humanitarian aid. Limited in its assistance to the most insecure areas, humanitarian aid has reproduced existing social inequalities by providing access to goods and services for families with more resources. The installation of the entire humanitarian aid industry in the cities in the south of the province (in Pemba, as well as Montepuez) has revitalised economic sectors affected by the interruption of extractive projects, such as hotels and restaurants, rental of houses and warehouses, freight transport and rent-a-car, revitalising local content and employing hundreds of local young people. The text demonstrates the lack of coordination between intervention policies on the part of the State and humanitarian organisations, particularly evident from the end of 2021, when the intensification of counter-terrorist actions was accompanied by increased difficulties in food assistance.

In resettlement places competition for access to land and tensions with the indigenous populations have increased, and the difficulty of access to means of production and uncertainty of food assistance have precipitated return movements to particularly insecure locations, making them easy targets for attacks, robberies and kidnappings, further intensifying the conflict. The State, development agencies and civil society organisations face a strategic dilemma: risk returning populations to insecure locations or promote socio-economic development in

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resettlement locations by compensating local populations for the provision of land for agricultural production and subsidising economic activities.

## INTRODUCTION

As a result of natural disasters, long armed conflicts, compulsive attempts to modernize the countryside and implement infrastructure, the contemporary history of Mozambique is also the history of forced migrations and humanitarian intervention. In recent decades, the country has been the scene of United Nations assistance, becoming an important beneficiary of international aid. Following the armed conflict that ravaged the north-east of Cabo Delgado, the number of displaced persons has been growing steadily, exceeding 700,000 individuals by 2021. These populations are concentrated in the south and west of the province, creating a major challenge for humanitarian intervention.

Based on administrative data, questionnaire surveys and field observations, this text aims to characterise the socio-economic conditions of displaced populations in Northern Mozambique, particularly in terms of access to housing, water and sanitation, energy, food aid and means of production. It shows that migration has aggravated poverty and social differentiation in the province, with great uncertainty about the future.

## 1. A LONG EXPERIENCE OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT

Over the last decades, Mozambique has been the scene of various phenomena of forced displacement, facing the challenges of population resettlement, whether as a result of armed conflicts, attempts to modernise the countryside or natural disasters.

The management of rural African populations and their settlement in "*aldeamentos indígenas*", as a mechanism of colonial development, was a concern dating back to the 1920s to 1940s (Coelho, 1993: 120-122; Direito, 2014: 781). On the one hand, there was the installation of settlements in areas of agricultural potential, in various provinces of the country, aiming at the installation of hundreds of European families, together with African families<sup>2</sup>. In the 1960s, following the beginning of the national liberation struggle (*Luta de Libertação Nacional*) and as a strategy to face a guerrilla warfare, several villages were implemented, particularly in the provinces of Cabo Delgado (particularly south of the Messalo River), Niassa and Tete (mainly south of the Mazoe River). Although in theory the villages envisaged the socioeconomic development of the population (through the creation of schools, health centres, boreholes, shops and, in some places, veterinary services, in addition to a church and/or mosque), the establishment of the villages had military objectives, seeking to create a buffer zone and prevent Frelimo from penetrating the rural areas, avoiding the involvement of the population with the guerrilla movement and its logistical support. Besides enabling better control and monitoring of contacts maintained by the population, the village allowed for a system of self-defence, through the training of militias and controlled distribution of weapons. This plan also aimed to create a reserve of workforce, from which the economic activities to be developed would benefit (Adam, 1991: 193). The formation of villages took place in a compulsory and violent manner. When the thousands of peasants, concentrated by the colonial authorities, were attacked in the villages by the nationalists, they

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<sup>2</sup> The aim was the European settlement of the territory, facilitating colonial administration, constituting a barrier to the expansion of independence movements, increasing agricultural production to supply the emerging agro-processing industry and African cities, and diverting Portuguese migration from European and American destinations to the colonies (Castelo, 2007; 2021).

were denied any option (Borges Coelho, 2003: 181). The villages were designated by the peasants as "currais" (Feijó, 2020) or "goat urinals" (Adam, 1991: 192), representing a very different scenario from what had been promised by the colonial administration. Population concentration increased competition for access to productive land, grazing areas and other resources, increasing food insecurity. The agglomeration of people entailed the breakdown of ties with the land, which had always been a structuring source of community cohesion and a basic resource for material and cultural reproduction and survival. It affected political and family relations, whose logic had always been based on territory, and established the perfect breeding ground for outbreaks of disease (Borges Coelho, 1993: 231). It is estimated that, in Tete province, around 70% of the rural population was transferred to villages during the six years of the program (Coelho, 1993: 307-322) and that in Niassa province, 227,647 Africans were concentrated in 154 villages (Castelo, 2021: 487).

The armed conflict resulted in the movement of refugees to neighbouring countries. Immediately after the beginning of the war, about 10,000 Mozambicans crossed the border into Tanzania, fleeing reprisals by the Portuguese military. The number of refugees grew steadily, reaching 29,000 in 1969, around the time of the implementation of Operation Gordian Knot (Egero, 1979: 33-34). With the support of the Tanzanian government and international organisations, Frelimo participated in the organisation of refugee centres. The largest was located in Lutamba (in Lindi province in southern Tanzania), which in the early years experienced a rapid increase in the number of refugees, resulting in overcrowding and the spread of diseases (such as cholera), lack of food or access to productive land. A large proportion of the refugees left for other cities in Tanzania where they had relatives as a result of previous migratory trajectories (Alpers, 1984). As the liberation struggle continued, other camps were set up and the conditions of displaced persons improved, providing Frelimo staff with experience in administration, including the organisation of schools, health centres and orphanages (Santos, 2010: 130).

After independence, and in an attempt to reconstitute the rural economy, various measures were implemented to socialize the countryside, including the constitution of communal villages, recreating previous experiences. Thousands of peasants were resettled in hundreds of communal villages, with a view to providing access to infrastructure and services (schools and health centres), organising production cooperatives or constituting a permanent reserve of agricultural labour for state companies (Casal, 1988: 180). As the conflict with Renamo escalated, the constitution of communal villages again became aimed at military objectives: to withdraw, this time, the populations from Renamo's influence, to guarantee the protection of civilians and access to humanitarian aid. In 1984, between 1,400 and 1,500 communal villages (with populations of about 4,000) were officially registered<sup>3</sup>, of which 600 in Cabo Delgado, 250 in Nampula and 250 in the Zambeze and Limpopo valleys (Cahen, 1987: 52).

Although it had positive impacts at the level of access to education and health services, enabling the channelling of emergency aid into food and drinking water, the constitution of communal villages again had a set of negative effects on the peasant family economy. In addition to the coercive process involved, in many cases, these population resettlement processes have increased the distances between home and production areas (increasing travel times and making it difficult to transport equipment and crops); the reduction of production areas or the exploitation of areas unsuitable for agriculture as a result of the scarcity of land near the villages; contradictions between the original villagers and the new occupants; increased pressure on natural resources; or

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<sup>3</sup> In 1982, out of 1,352 communal farms, 543, or 40%, were concentrated in Cabo Delgado province, while 260 (19% of the total) were distributed in Nampula. The southern Gaza province had some 139 communal farms, a little more than 10% of the total (Thomaz, 2008: 185-186). In Cabo Delgado about 45% of the total population of the province was displaced to the farms, while in Gaza 17% of the total population, or 30% of its rural population, was concentrated.

problems in livestock, due to distance from grazing areas and vulnerability to theft (Casal, 1988: 167-186). These impacts were reflected in the diet of many families, contributing to the general impoverishment. Through various strategies - such as abandoning villages or maintaining false residences, and continuing production on the land of origin - the peasants' reaction was often one of non-participation. The beginning and, especially, the spreading of the conflict with Renamo, transformed the process of rural socialisation into generalised chaos, marked by attacks by armed groups, looting, kidnappings and slaughters, during which the impoverished populations did not always distinguish who was attacking them and who was defending them (Casal, 1988: 190).

Seeking to limit the urban population and control migration<sup>4</sup> in order to prevent problems related to unemployment, criminality or political opposition, the Frelimo government moved thousands of individuals from urban centres to isolated areas, especially in the north of the country. Also during the Transitional Government, the so called *Operação Limpeza* was carried out, which consisted in capturing prostitutes from the large cities of Mozambique and they were sent to re-education camps in the North of the country (Thomaz, 2008: 178). Throughout the first years of independence, thousands of Mozambicans were sent, in successive waves, to re-education camps, namely those who were considered to be "saboteurs", "marginals" or "enemies" of the revolution, as well as those who had "colonial habits" or bourgeois habits that were intended to be eliminated, with a view to the creation of the New Man<sup>5</sup>. These initiatives gained greater relevance in 1983, with the *Operação Produção* (Operation Production), which consisted in the identification and deportation to the North of the country of those considered to be "unproductive", which in practice meant all those who could not prove that they were employed, including informal workers<sup>6</sup>. *Operação Produção* resulted in the forced transfer to labour camps of between 50,000 and 100,000 people, mainly from Mozambican cities, including at least 30,000 from Maputo (Vines, 1991: 101). In the places of destination, the problems were enormous: lack of infrastructure and services, clothes to protect against cold and soap, agricultural inputs, severe illness and food insecurity (Quembo, 2012). In re-education camps, corporal punishment, collective humiliation and food deprivation were particularly incisive (Sá, 25.06.1995: 18-28).

External destabilization attempts triggered by the apartheid, Rhodesian and South African regimes, as well as deep internal contradictions within Mozambican society, resulted in sixteen years of armed conflict. Directly or indirectly, the 16-year war implied the forced displacement of millions of Mozambicans. Insecurity forced most of the rural population to flee to urban centres or to neighbouring countries. Migration took place on a regional scale, as communications between the country's different provinces had become difficult: bridges and roads were Renamo's privileged targets. As a result of the 16-year war and based on UNHCR data, Raimundo (2008: 4) estimates that there were 4 million IDPs, noting the total repatriation of 1,700,000 Mozambicans from neighbouring countries between 1992 and 1994. Among these was Malawi, which repatriated 1,285,000 refugees, followed by Zimbabwe (247,000) and South Africa (71,000). If migratory movements for work purposes have acquired a predominantly male character, in

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<sup>4</sup> The concern to limit the flow of migrants to large urban areas was transversal to several African countries, and various measures were adopted, including the strict control of migration to cities (South Africa), urban dispersion (Nigeria), the promotion of medium-sized cities (Zambia and Algeria), the creation of new capital cities (Nigeria and Tanzania) or forced migration to rural areas (Mozambique) (Lynch, 2005: 118)

<sup>5</sup> The list of deportees included Frelimo dissidents, *régulos*, witch doctors, "compromised" (individuals who were suspected of having some kind of commitment to the old colonial order), students considered subversive, *Testemunhas de Jeová*, single mothers or prostitutes, among others (Thomaz, 2008).

<sup>6</sup> This measure was a late response to a set of phenomena that had been registered since independence, related to the departure of settlers and closure of their businesses, or with the drastic cut in recruitment of miners to South Africa, with consequences on urban unemployment, particularly in the south of the country (Brito, 2011: 13).

refugee movements women have gained greater prominence, many having to face complicated situations alone (Vivet, 2015: 90).

Following the signing of the General Peace Agreement, millions of individuals returned to their places of origin, deprived of capital and generally without access to infrastructure and services (medical, education, water or sanitation). The population return triggered land conflicts, largely between individuals who had occupied the peri-urban areas and the returning populations (Myers et al, 1994: 119-120). In rural areas, vegetation had grown up and made it difficult to identify the boundaries of many plots of land. Rivalries, old or arising during the armed conflict, manifested themselves again through land conflicts. On the other hand, disputes arose between land users and land owners, as well as between commercial farmers with formal rights and peasants with customary rights (Blom, 2002: 118).

As a result of natural disasters, there have been forced movements of hundreds of thousands of individuals, particularly following the 1977 floods in the Limpopo Valley, the 2000 floods (Christie and Hanlon, 2001), or following cyclones IDAI (Mandamule, 2020) and Kenneth in 2019, among other natural phenomena. Inevitably, they faced problems of rescue, displacement to higher ground and all the difficulties of building shelters, access to water and food, dramatically increasing the number of cholera and malaria cases, and there was also plenty of looting and conflicts resulting from land disputes and access to food aid (Feijó and Aiuba, 2019). Mozambique became familiar with the arrival of international volunteers and members of the United Nations, which assumed a prominent role in the coordination of humanitarian aid.

In the new millennium, as a result of the construction of large infrastructures (mining operations or logistical support, bridges) or the penetration of agribusiness (forest plantations, ProSAVANA), new dynamics of population resettlement is notable. Investments in the Nacala corridor (Shankland e Gonçalves, 2016; Mandamule e Bruna, 2017; Gonçalves, 2020), mining projects in Tete province (Mosca e Selemene, 2011; Kirshner e Power, 2015; Lesutis, 2019) and gas exploration in the Rovuma basin were responsible for the resettlement of thousands of individuals, in controversial and conflicting processes.

More recently, the intensification of the conflict in the north-east of Cabo Delgado resulted in the forced displacement of more than 700,000 individuals, raising problems of humanitarian aid, namely water, sanitation and food aid, as well as of land and means of production, making evident the fragility of the State in assisting displaced populations (Nhamirre et al, 2021).

The contemporary history of Mozambique is the history of violent forced displacements, which is why the country has accumulated experience in terms of emergency and humanitarian interventions, although it is increasingly dependent on United Nations organizations.

## **1. METHODOLOGY**

The main objective of this research is the analysis of the socio-economic conditions of war displaced persons throughout the year 2021. Specifically, the study aims to identify the geographical origin of the displaced populations, resettlement conditions, economic reintegration, exercise of citizenship, as well as prospects of returning to their place of origin.

The methodology of analysis was based on the combination of qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques. Firstly, questionnaire surveys were applied to IDPs in 6 different districts of Cabo Delgado and Nampula, namely in Pemba municipality (70), in the administrative post of Mapupulo (70), in Montepuez district, in Marrupa (70), in Chiúre district and in Corrane (70), in

Meconta district, in Nampula province. For each of the chosen locations, the sample has a 90% confidence level and a 10% margin of error. The choice of these locations was related to the fact that they are areas of strong presence of IDPs, coming from the Northeast of Cabo Delgado. The sample was probabilistic and systematic. After identifying the first household at random, the others were selected systematically, 5 by 5 houses, along each street.

The questionnaire survey was complemented by semi-structured interviews and field observations. Interviews were conducted with humanitarian aid workers, teachers, local doctors and technicians from the Serviços Distritais da Educação, Juventude e Tecnologia, and the Serviços Distritais de Saúde, Mulher e Acção Social; and the Serviços Distritais de Planeamento e Infra-estruturas.

The observation took place in two periods. A first observation was carried out by the authors during April 2021 in the districts of Pemba, Montepuez, Chiúre and Meconta. In a second moment, a group of observation assistants was formed in the districts of Nangade, Muidumbe, Montepuez, Chiúre, Meconta and the municipality of Pemba who, on a fortnightly basis, were providing information around a set of indicators, around the dimensions of socio-economic integration of the displaced persons such as their housing conditions, economic activities and access to land for production, food and humanitarian aid, infrastructure and services available in the centres for displaced persons (in terms of health, education and support for economic activities), but also in terms of security and the exercise of citizenship.

## **2. MOVEMENTS AND COMPOSITION OF IDPs**

The beginning of the armed conflict in North-East of Cabo Delgado has generated several population movements, which have been transformed over time. In a first phase, from 2017 to 2019, populations moved mainly from villages in the coastal districts to other villages or to the district headquarters villages, with a large population contingent concentrated in the town of Mocímboa da Praia and Palma, as well as in Macomia and Pemba.

With the increase in the insurgents' military power and attacks on the district headquarters villages, from the second quarter of 2020, population flows intensified, with a diversification of destinations (see Map 1). A large part of the population moved south, concentrated in the Metuge areas, and west, to the town of Mueda, from where many moved to Montepuez. By sea, and coming from the coast, a large flow of displaced persons reached the beaches of Pemba, after long journeys in craft boats, with a stopover at the Quirimbas islands. Thousands of people have concentrated on the islands of Vamizi, Matemo, Quiziwi, Ncomangano and Ibo, in a situation of great deprivation, waiting for safer moments to return.

In the third quarter of 2020, there is a large population densification in neighbourhoods of Pemba, as well as in Metuge, Ancuabe, Montepuez and Mueda. At the end of 2020 and during 2021, camps for displaced persons began to develop and consolidate in the southern areas, particularly in the districts of Chiúre, Ancuabe and Montepuez, and in Nampula province, with support from international aid and the Mozambican government. Throughout the first half of 2021, new contingents of displaced persons arrived, particularly after the attack on the town of Palma, with a significant population flow to Nangade, Mueda and Montepuez, Pemba and Chiúre, among other places.




At the end of 2021, the vast majority of the displaced remained on the periphery of the conflict, largely in Pemba City (150,712), in the administrative post of Metuge Sede (79,654 displaced) and Mapupulo, district of Montepuez (35,332), but also to the North, in Mueda-Sede (40,804) and Nangade-Sede (48,277) (see Map 1).

The displaced persons in these administrative posts represented more than half (53.4%) of all displaced persons in the province.

While it is true that most of the displaced persons were hosted by family members (particularly in the urban centres of Pemba and Montepuez, in December 2021, the IOM counted 204,868 Displaced persons dispersed in 80 locations, most of which were designated relocation centres (64) and temporary centres (11). Map 2 describes the geographical distribution of temporary centres and resettlement centres in December 2021, allowing the following considerations to be made: Firstly, it can be seen that the overwhelming majority of displaced persons are concentrated in the South of the province, around the Pemba - Balama axis, with a higher incidence in the districts of Metuge and Montepuez, therefore close to the main urban centres, important access roads, public services and humanitarian assistance. Metuge and Montepuez hosted almost half (47.5%) of all displaced persons in centres in Cabo Delgado province.

Conversely, a reduced number of centres for displaced persons is observed in the North of the province, illustrating the difficulties of humanitarian aid intervention in particularly insecure areas, conditioned by authorizations from the Ministry of Defence.


Finally, it is important to mention the persistence of temporary centres for displaced persons, especially in Metuge (where as many as 14,842 individuals are registered in a single centre), but also in Montepuez and Mueda, reflecting the situation of uncertainty for tens of thousands of displaced persons.




Among the IDPs, there is an over-representation of women. As Map 3 shows, in the great majority of the districts where the presence of displaced persons was noted, more than 55% of the adult population was composed of women. The percentage of women among the adult population was close to two thirds in Metuge (66.3%) and in Mueda (65.3), reaching 80.5% in Mapupulo, in the district of Montepuez. This phenomenon becomes more significant if we take into account that these 3 administrative posts are among the top 5 in terms of the quantity of displaced population. The over-representation of women was observed in almost all the areas with a high presence of displaced persons (in Montepuez, Metuge, Meconta and Nangade), fuelling a set of suspicions and speculations about the location of their husbands. This stigma was observed in Montepuez, particularly in relation to the displaced Mwani population, mostly women. In food and beverage establishments, local youths were observed, intoxicated, calling Mwanis individuals al-shabaabs. Reports of many single-parent families headed by Mwanis women, from the Milamba and Nanduadua neighbourhoods (in Mocímboa da Praia), with the ability to acquire land and build houses, refer to mistrust and surveillance by the population. Reports from displaced individuals reveal the feeling of insecurity for holding an identification document revealing residence in Mocímboa da Praia, since it may trigger opportunistic situations on the part of law enforcement agents. This situation feeds the phenomena of Islamophobia.

On the other hand, data shows high rates of children among the displaced (see Map 4), reaching a proportion of 3.2 children per adult in the administrative post of Mieza (Metuge district) and 2.7 in Metoro and Ancuabe-Sede, in Ancuabe district. The proportions reach extreme values (4.5 children/adult) in districts of Nampula and Niassa provinces, but become insignificant due to the comparatively small displaced population. The high presence of minors increases humanitarian concerns, particularly in terms of medical and food, but also around education services.

**Map 3: Percentage of women among displaced adult population (Nov./2021)**



**Map 4: Percentage of under-18s among the displaced population**



Source: IOM, Nov./2021

Based on observation in the field and interaction with displaced populations and humanitarian aid workers, it was possible to conclude that, depending on their financial resources and family relationships, displaced populations were resettled in different ways, reflecting the social differentiation in the province:

Firstly, numerous individuals unable to flee, in indeterminate numbers, often less educated individuals, without documentation, without capital or with fewer family contacts in the south of the province, continued to reside in the areas of instability, along the coast or on the islands (where they made their living from fishing), but also in the districts of Muidumbe and Nangade. These populations continued to reside in areas relatively close to their places of origin, sleeping in the bush and in constant readiness to flee an attack. On the outskirts of the district headquarters villages (Nangade, Mueda, Palma), generally more protected by the Defence and Security Forces and local militias, people concentrated in family homes and yards, or in expansion areas, building their homes with precarious materials, but with limited access to international aid and exposed to food shortages and inflation (Anacleto, 06.02.2021).

Secondly, a group composed of economically more affluent individuals (civil servants, pensioners, traders with greater capacity), individuals with family contacts or even residences further south or west in the province (Pemba, Montepuez or Nampula), managed to create conditions to evacuate their families beforehand, sometimes transporting their belongings. This group has settled in the main urban centres or accessed the population resettlement places, attracted by the distribution of land and food aid.

Thirdly, it is possible to identify a third group, constituting the majority of displaced persons, who left their place of origin without the possibility of planning their escape, leaving their heritage behind. Throughout 2020, following insurgent incursions on several district headquarters villages, safer areas such as Metuge, Palma or Mueda hosted tens of thousands of displaced individuals. The populations were directed to school places (closed due to COVID-19 containment measures) or areas near warehouses, where precarious shelters were built or campaign tents were distributed for the agglomeration of several families.

### **3. RESETTLEMENT CONDITIONS**

#### **3.1. Housing**


In view of the avalanche of displaced populations and the approaching rainy season in the last quarter of 2020, attention has been focused on the destination to be given to these populations. Population densification in high water table areas and the lack of sanitation conditions increased the risk of cholera and diarrhoea. On the other hand, the issue of the sustainability of food assistance and the need for access to land in order to prepare an agricultural campaign before the onset of the rains has been raised.

It is in this context that, from late 2020 onwards, new population settlements, some more organized, HAVE been forming in various areas south of Cabo Delgado and north of Nampula. In some places, the International Organization for Migration and technicians from the district infrastructure planning services planned the land, with parallel and perpendicular roads. In other places, displaced persons were simply directed to expansion areas of existing villages, and were allocated variable spaces in an unplanned manner. Displaced populations were mobilised to clear land, who were subsequently allocated plots of 15 by 20 metres to build huts, with space for small vegetable gardens. The mobilization effort was significant and young local volunteers contributed

to the cutting of stakes for the construction of houses, although often in insufficient quantity. The houses were built with walls of pau a pique, bamboo and matope and covered with canvas and reeds. Although they have guaranteed living conditions to hundreds of thousands of displaced families, compared to their places of origin, there has been a clear reduction in housing conditions. According to the results of the questionnaire survey, while in the place of origin between 64.3% and 88.6% of the displaced had a roof constructed with conventional materials (zinc sheets, lusalite or tiles), this percentage fell to residual values in the places of destination (between 0 and 10%). With the exception of those displaced persons who stayed with family members in the Paquitequete neighbourhood, in the municipality of Pemba, where 97% of the residences were covered with conventional materials (see Chart1). These figures hide, however, the high population densification (often more than 20 people living in the same house) and strong pressure on sanitation conditions in Paquitequete neighbourhood.

If we compare the housing characteristics of this population in their places of origin, with the data from the 2017 census (INE, 2017), it can be seen that this is a privileged population in the context of the province. According to the 2017 Census data, 41% of the population in Mocímboa da Praia district, 44.5% in Macomia, 15.2% in Quissanga, 25.8% in Palma and 47.4% in Nangade had access to home coverage with conventional material.

**Chart 1: Material used for the roof covering**



### 3.2. Sanitation


The same situation was observed in terms of sanitation conditions. The data from the National Institute for Statistics reveal the precariousness of sanitation conditions in North-East of Cabo Delgado. The data from the 2017 Census show precarious sanitation conditions in Cabo Delgado's Northeast, with the predominance of open defecation situations. In fact, only 21.6% of the population in Mocímboa da Praia district, 18.7% in Macomia, 10.9% in Quissanga, 15.2% in Palma and 24.7% in Nangade had access to safe sanitation (improved toilet or latrine).

Similarly, among the families surveyed in resettlement centres, access to sanitation was a privilege for a minority group. As Chart 2 illustrates, before the conflict, families who had access to improved latrine represented only 21.4% of families who moved to Montepuez, 26.2% of those who moved to Chiúre and 28.6% of those surveyed in Paquitequete.

Following the intensification of attacks and the increase in displaced populations in the south of the province, one of the first major concerns of the authorities was the construction of community latrines in areas of high concentration of displaced persons, often near residences, causing situations of discomfort and tension. In Metuge, episodes of attacks and destruction of latrines were reported, in which the "land owners" were not consulted, feeling threatened with the loss of land and resources.

In the better planned resettlement centres, namely in Marrupa (Chiúre), Mapupulo (Montepuez) and Corrane (Meconta) there were campaigns to mobilise displaced populations to build latrines on their own plots of land. In mid-2021, slab latrines were distributed in these resettlement centres. Despite the collective effort to create minimum sanitation conditions, the conditions of the displaced families surveyed worsened: only 3.1% of the displaced in Chiúre, 13% of the displaced in Meconta and 18.6% of the displaced in Montepuez benefit from improved sanitation. The exception is the neighbourhood of Paquitequete, where the majority benefited from previously existing sanitation infrastructure, although heavily saturated<sup>7</sup>(see Chart 2).

**Chart 2: Sanitation conditions in displaced persons concentration locations**



Residing in militarily unstable areas, often on the run, and limited in access to humanitarian aid, the northern region has seen heavy pressure on sanitation conditions (mainly in the main towns, where there has been a greater concentration of population), as well as the use of precarious or even open latrines among populations hiding in rural areas


### 3.3. Water

The displacement of hundreds of thousands of individuals has placed great pressure on water. A noticeable effort has been made in terms of drilling boreholes in the displacement centres, with work being carried out to install water mains in Metuge, Chiúre and Meconta. Although queues remain long during peak hours, more than 95% of the respondents in the centres for displaced persons of Marrupa (Chiúre) and Corrane (in Marrupa) had access to water from a borehole with a hand pump. The situation was also positive in the Paquitequete neighbourhood (in Pemba), due

<sup>7</sup> The campaigns to eliminate open defecation were not accompanied by the massive construction of latrines in a neighbourhood where the water table is very high. The latrines that have been built are not sufficient for the needs, so the few that exist are shared by dozens of neighbours. The situation has worsened with the arrival of thousands of displaced persons.

to the existence of FIPAG infrastructure and boreholes. The situation was even an improvement compared to the places of origin, where the percentage of access to water from unprotected wells, rivers or lakes represented, in some cases, more than 50% of access to water (see Chart 3). The resettlement situation provided a relative improvement in the conditions of access to water for displaced populations compared to the places of origin.

**Chart 3: Source of water used for consumption**



On the plateau, serious water supply problems were noted. Through the bush, access to water is through small streams and unprotected sources. On the plateau of Mueda, the scarcity of water resulted in price inflation. By the end of 2021, individuals were selling 20-litre drums of water for 40 meticaís. However, the situation improved with the stabilization of security conditions on the plateau, allowing for an increase in international aid, and the supply of water to displaced populations through the use of cisterns.


### 3.4. Energy

In terms of access to energy, the conditions of IDPs have clearly worsened. According to questionnaires applied to the IDPs, before the conflict, approximately half of the displaced persons (46.4% in Meconta, 44.8% in Chiúre and 70% in Pemba) had access to electricity in their place of origin from the Mozambique Electricity network. If we compare with the data from the 2017 Census (according to which 11.2% of the province's population had access to energy, particularly the urban population (41.7%) and residually the rural population (3.2%)<sup>8</sup> - we found that the displaced populations in these centres are predominantly urban and with greater economic power.

In the resettlement places, there was a clear reduction in access to electricity (see Chart 4). With the exception of the Paquitequete neighbourhood (located in the urban area of the city of Pemba and where access reaches 97.1%), in all other areas, access to electric energy is limited to the use of solar panels, not exceeding 15% coverage.

<sup>8</sup> According to the 2017 Census data, access to energy from the Electricidade de Moçambique was the prerogative of 15.4% of the population in Mocimboa da Praia, 10.2% in Palma, 8.5% in Nangade, 6.2% in Macomia and 3.2% in Quissanga.


**Chart 4: Access to electricity for lighting**



In some areas of the Meconta and Chiúre centres for displaced persons, solar-powered lampposts were installed to provide light at night. Due to the destruction of the Awasse substation, a large part of the northern area remained without access to power for almost a year. Only after the Rwandan intervention did stability return, which allowed power to be re-established (Miguel, 04.08.2021). In the urban centres of the Northern region (Mueda municipality), urban energy was only distributed through generators or solar panels.

### 3.5 Access to health and food security

Problems in access to health care are widely documented and translate into a lack of doctors, diagnostic and clinical analysis equipment, circulating means, medicines, among others (CIP, 2022). From the PESOD reports for 12 of the 17 districts in the province, it is possible to see that the ratio of doctors per inhabitant is always much higher than 10,000 (World Health Organization recommendation), exceeding one doctor for 80,000 inhabitants in Metuge and Nangade and reaching one doctor per 136,000 inhabitants in Namuno (see Map 5).




The fact that the IDPs were directed to the areas closest to the district headquarters, allowed for a population concentration within a relatively close range to the existing health infrastructure, reducing the travel time to the health units. At the same time, the security difficulties in the north of the province channelled all international support to the centres for displaced persons in the south of the province, with the presence of medical and nursing personnel, often in mobile teams, integrated with or with the support of the United Nations, the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières, among others.

This phenomenon has contributed to a reduction in travel time for populations to access health units in 3 of the 4 centres for displaced persons: from 49 minutes to 10 minutes among those resettled in Corrane, in Meconta; from 21 to 13 minutes among those resettled in Paquitequete (Pemba) and from 68 to 55 minutes among those resettled in Mapupulo, in Montepuez. With the exception of those displaced from the Marrupa displaced persons centre (in Chiúre), who reported an increase in the distance travelled to a health facility from 45 to 172 minutes (see Chart 5).



**Chart 5: Comparison of average time to access a health facility on foot in place of origin and current location, in minutes**



Despite the decrease in the distances to access health services, the population concentration has considerably increased the pressure on these services. Based on observations in the field, conversations with health technicians and users, the persistence of long waiting lines and lack of medical assistance is noted. Medical staff report situations of minor injuries, fatigue and dehydration (especially among new arrivals), malaria and diarrhoea. From 2020 to February 2021, 2,551 cases of cholera were recorded, culminating in 14 deaths. In the first quarter of 2021, there were cholera cases in Pemba, Metuge, Montepuez, Chiúre and Ancuabe. Outbreaks of cholera and diarrhoea were also reported in Nampula, in the Namialo and Corrane areas (in Meconta), with 346 cases of cholera recorded in 2021 (Few Net, 2021: 12). On the other hand, psychosocial problems resulting from traumatic experiences lived during the escape have been recorded. Psychosocial assistance is almost non-existent and this lack is filled by religious organisations. According to psychologists interviewed in the field, the situation of unemployment and lack of prospects for the future fuels depression. Among young men, the lack of sources of income and the lack of opportunities to create economic activities generates stress, especially due to the inability to provide for the family and young wives. In the older camps for displaced persons, social workers were identified carrying out activities with children and young adults.

Due to the destruction of health units, assaults on pharmacies and the fleeing of medical personnel, the situation in the northern region was particularly dramatic. During the first quarter of 2021, access to doctors was only possible in the main towns of Nangade, Mueda and Palma, involving risky and costly travel. After the attack on Palma in March 2021, the situation further worsened in the Northeast of the province. The abrupt and sudden increase in the number of displaced persons, travelling huge distances on foot and without any humanitarian assistance, generated problems of dehydration, diarrhoea, cholera and malnutrition. Displaced persons in Quitunda reported cholera epidemics and a total lack of means to assist the population, given the impotence of the military authorities. The situation was mitigated in the second half of 2021, with the Rwandan intervention and the increased presence of military medical corps assisting the population.

Based on interviews with women who had been held captive by the insurgents (Feijó, 2021), it was found that the group tried to recreate a health care system, setting up (voluntarily or involuntarily) a small team of nurses and nurses' aides, had a store of stolen medicines, provided rudimentary health care to the population (including malaria and HIV-AIDS diagnoses, and assisted with medicines, generally paracetamol), combined with traditional medicine.


The abandonment of the places of origin resulted in a clear decrease in agricultural and fishing production, interrupting commercial circuits and increasing the dependence of the populations in terms of food aid. Complemented by other organisations, such as Cáritas and Islamic entrepreneurs, the World Food Programme (WFP) was the major provider of food aid, increasing assistance to displaced populations, especially from 2020 onwards: from 29,000 individuals assisted in January 2020 to 935,000 in September 2021 (OMR, 11.11.2021: 3). WFP's humanitarian response plan in 2022 is to assist 1.1 million people.

Food assistance has essentially been carried out in three ways. Firstly, through food assistance, distributed on a regular basis. However, due to insufficient resources, over the second half of 2021, WFP was forced to reduce, by about half, the food basket to meet only 39% of the populations' caloric needs (OMR, 11.11.2021: 3). The food kit consists of rice, oil and beans. Second, WFP provided immediate response rations for people in the process of displacement or in hard-to-reach areas, as well as supplementary assistance for children aged 6-59 months. Thirdly, in places where market and security conditions permitted, WFP assisted through cash transfers of 3,600 meticais per month, reaching 36% of beneficiaries. The amount was used to purchase food products from local economic agents, with emphasis on maize flour, rice, beans, spaghetti pasta, cooking oil or sugar.

In October 2020, with the exception of Chiúre district (where only 17.1% of displaced persons did not have access to food aid), in the other locations the shortages were widespread, especially in the Meconta resettlement centre. Throughout the last quarter of 2020 and first quarter of 2021, security and logistical conditions were created to feed the resettled populations. In March 2021, the vast majority of displaced persons already had access to food aid, particularly in Meconta (see Chart 6). The increasing arrival of displaced persons, however, put greater pressure on food needs and thus a growing number of individuals were deprived of support, particularly new arrivals.


In the city of Pemba, the food problem presented particular difficulties due to the absence of agricultural production and security constraints on access to the sea. The situation has eased with the departure of numerous displaced persons from Pemba city to the districts of Montepuez, Ancuabe and Chiúre, as well as to the coast of Quissanga, especially from the second half of 2021 onwards.

**Chart 6: Percentage of displaced persons who did not receive any monthly food aid (Oct/2020-Mar/2021)**



Despite the food distribution efforts, the reality is that there was a decrease in the average number of meals taken before and after the displacement process. This phenomenon was particularly visible among the displaced persons in Mapupulo, in Montepuez (where the average number of meals decreased from 2.7 to 1.7) and Marrupa, in Chiúre (where the decrease was from 2.8 to 2.1). The highest average number of daily meals (2.4) was recorded in Paquitequete neighbourhood in Pemba city, the only place where there was no decrease in the number of meals taken (see Chart 7):

**Chart 7: Average number of daily meals of respondents, in the place of origin and in the current place**



The observations carried out in the south of the province show that the different forms of access to food aid have generated social differentiation, expressed not only in the quantity but also in the variety of food consumed. In this process, two types of families are distinguished. On one hand, those who had more resources to move to the south of the province, where they arrived in the last quarter of 2020, before the avalanche of displaced persons and therefore with easy access to land and time to prepare the agricultural campaign (before the onset of rains). From April 2021 these families supplemented food aid with their agricultural production, improving their diet.

Although they continue to depend on donations, these households have managed to sell small surpluses to purchase other products, opening small trade stands, complementing their income. Among this group, civil servants and pensioners also stand out, whose income enables them to guarantee food aid, the acquisition or renting of land, and also of means of production for complementary income generation.

In turn, the most debilitated represent those who arrived less recently to the resettlement places, and those who remained further north. The new arrivals presented greater difficulties in accessing agricultural land and encountered the problem of inclusion in the lists of displaced persons, waiting several weeks without support. In a situation of food deprivation, this group tends to have a foraging behaviour, surviving on vegetables or hunting creeping animals (for consumption or sale), in a relationship of extreme dependence on others.

In the north of the province the humanitarian situation was much more serious. Military instability hampered the circulation of goods, resulting in an increase in the price of basic necessities. The attack on Palma at the end of March 2021 triggered a new contingent of displaced persons to the districts of Nangade and Mueda or to the Quitunda resettlement centre in Palma, where they arrived hungry and without access to means of production. Due to military instability, throughout the first half of 2021, the distribution of humanitarian aid in the north of the province was heavily conditioned. In Nangade, 25kg sacks of flour were divided among 25 individuals, resulting in quantities that were clearly insufficient for one month. The displaced populations survived by resorting to wild tubers and fruits, gleaned crop remains or resorting cassava leaves for consumption, with a maximum of one meal a day. The situation was less serious for those who had moved longer, with some time to prepare an agricultural campaign, guaranteeing food reserves for the following months. The situation changed in the second half of 2021, when the Rwandan intervention allowed for greater military stability on the plateau, facilitating the arrival of humanitarian aid. However, the supply was marked by irregularity, by insufficient food.

In the city of Pemba, social differentiation is clearly evident between hosts and displaced populations. Food aid is provided to host families as a form of support to new arrivals. During the questionnaires, several displaced women complained about the behaviour of the host families during periods of interruption in the provision of food aid, when the hosts became rougher in their relationship with the guests.

Faced with lack of land for cultivation, dependency and irregularity of food donations, many families feel obliged to carefully manage their food. On the other hand, part of the food is sold to buy other basic necessities not provided by humanitarian organisations, as well as to finance unexpected expenses, including travel.

As in other disaster situations, such as after Cyclone Idai (Feijó e Aiuba, 2019: 1-2), food distribution processes have involved situations of opportunism and widespread corruption, despite efforts to make them fairer. Numerous suspicions exist as to the actual number of displaced persons. According to the 2017 Census data, the sum of the population residing in the 8 districts most affected by the conflict (Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe, Palma and Quissanga) reached a total of 591,734 individuals<sup>9</sup>, a number clearly lower than the 697,538 displaced persons registered by IOM (difference of 105,804 individuals).

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<sup>9</sup> When analysing this demographic data, the following aspects should be taken into account. Firstly, the existence of several reports of areas of the coast not registered during the 2017 Census, due to the refusal of populations (already integrated in the al-shabaabs), transport difficulties to the many islands of the Quirimbas archipelago and the continuous migratory movements of fishermen between the mainland and the islands (avoiding the census officers), suggesting that the real numbers may be higher than those actually disclosed. Secondly, the natural growth of the population after 2017,

The reality is that the technicians who participate in the distribution of food aid denounce situations in which families inflate the number of members in order to obtain more food aid (Meconta). In various places (Montepuez, Mizeze and Pemba), there are many reports of non-displaced populations (known as natives) benefiting from food aid, in schemes involving community leaders (who include the extended family in the lists of beneficiaries) and which are therefore complex to manage. Residents in the city of Pemba reported clandestine sale of food vouchers by neighbourhood secretaries, involving amounts between 2,200 and 2,500 meticaís<sup>10</sup>.

In parallel, throughout the province there are reports of families who have no access to food aid. In Pemba City many individuals report being displaced and not having access to the 3,600 meticaís checks from WFP. Women in particular report being discriminated against in the distribution process. In focal groups held in Metuge, it was reported that younger and single women, as well as older women, are often left off distribution lists (OCHA, 2021). Technicians involved in humanitarian aid in Mpiri (Ancuabe district) reported prostitution in exchange for food, reported by the Centro de Integridade Pública and Human Rights Watch (Lusa, 08.09.2021). In October 2021, corruption schemes in the distribution system of food aid checks, which left many people without support, were reported to Mozambique's Deputy Attorney General (DW, 26.10.2021). The cutting off of food aid and the existence of different eating habits generate tensions between the population and the food aid workers (These situations generated tension, leading people to rebel against the authorities, as reported in Montepuez, Palma and Mueda (O.O., 28.10.2021) and Meconta.

### **3.6. Access to education**

Before the armed conflict, the province of Cabo Delgado already had the highest rates of illiteracy in the country, particularly in certain zones of the coast. As in other areas of the country, there was a lack of working resources, demotivation and technical-pedagogical difficulties among teachers, little or no school inspection (by the over-centralised and under-resourced provincial services), reduced involvement of families in school activities and high drop-out rates, directing children to engage in extractive activities, fishing or commerce, as well as to early marriages.

The armed conflict has aggravated the situation in the education sector in the North-East of Cabo Delgado province. Since they provide secular education, schools were one of the main targets of the insurgents, resulting in the destruction of the weak school property in the Northeast of Cabo Delgado. The armed conflict resulted in the destruction or closure of 354 primary schools and 7 secondary schools, affecting 86,835 students in primary education and 13,661 students in secondary education (Matias, 2020). Due to insecurity, the districts of Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe, Macomia and Quissanga experienced a total interruption of school activities throughout 2021. In the districts of Mueda, Nangade and Palma, teaching activities were essentially carried out at the district headquarters. Some of the schools not affected by the conflict were turned into accommodation centres, disturbing school activities.

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although the increase in mortality rates as a direct and indirect result of war and natural disasters must be considered. Thirdly, to the double registration of the same individuals by IOM over successive displacements as a result of continuous attacks. Finally, there are reports of families being double registered under different names for the purpose of duplicate food aid. The fact that many individuals have escaped without documentation prevents the verification of their geographical origins, opening space for opportunistic censuses, especially for any speaker of Northern languages in Cabo Delgado


<sup>10</sup> According to sources, a 3.500 Meticaís check is sold for 2.500 meticaís, and if two checks are bought the unit value can be reduced to 2.200 meticaís.

Insecurity led to the displacement of more than 2000 teachers and tens of thousands of students to several districts in the south of the province, concentrated in Pemba, Montepuez and Chiúre, resulting in a slow enrolment process. According to data provided by the Provincial Education Directorate, at the end of March 2021, the number of enrolments in resettlement zones represented 154% of what was expected, illustrating the avalanche of new students. In mid-April 2021, the number of students enrolled was still being updated, with a high student-teacher ratio in the schools in the south of the province.

In addition to these constraints, there are the preventative measures of COVID-19. According to the teachers interviewed, the practices of conducting school activities at a distance or the use of community radios had no impact in the first school years, so the subject matter that should have been covered in the 2020 school year was transferred to the subsequent year. In 2021, government instructions to limit the size of classes (to guarantee social distance) forced the multiplication of the number of classes, but with the same number of teachers, resulting in the implementation of interspersed timetables, to the detriment of compliance with the school programmes. In the schools visited, the teachers faced the challenge of teaching the syllabus for two school years in only two days of classes per week, without being able to present a teaching plan.

The data from the questionnaire surveys allow us to conclude that a large part of the displaced population has low levels of qualification, especially in Marrupa (Chiúre), Paquitequete (Pemba) and Mapupulo (Montepuez), where illiteracy rates are higher than 44%. In contrast, in the places further away from the conflict, namely Corrane (Meconta), the lowest levels of illiteracy (16.4%) were found, but also the highest rates of completion of secondary and higher education (see Chart 8).

**Chart 8: Education level of the head of household**




If the displacement to the city of Pemba translated into a decrease in the average travel time to primary schools, from 17 to 11 minutes, in the other resettlement locations there was an increase in the time travelled, from 26 to 49 minutes in Mapupulo (Montepuez) and from 27 to 37 minutes in Corrane (Meconta), with the time remaining similar in Marrupa (Chiúre). At the secondary school level, the increase in distance to school places was notable in Mapupulo, Montepuez (from 164 to 209 minutes), and in Marrupa, Chiúre (from 62 to 173 minutes). In the Paquitequete neighbourhood (Pemba) and in Corrane (Meconta), there was a slight reduction in the average travel time (from 36 to 24 minutes and from 63 to 52 minutes, respectively).

### 3.7. Ownership of assets

The process of population displacement in a war context was responsible for the destruction, theft and widespread abandonment of property, resulting, in the place of destination, in a clear decrease of durable goods, namely mobile phones, motorbikes and solar panels. Chart 9 shows that in the place of origin, the overwhelming majority of households (over 92%) owned at least one telephone, with a high percentage of households owning a solar panel (between 42.9% and 78.6%) and even a motorbike (between 42.9% and 52.9%):

**Chart 9: Ownership of assets before and after the armed conflict**




The level of ownership of these durable goods is clearly higher than the levels recorded in the 2017 Census. According to INE (2017), only 21.7% of households in the province had access to a mobile phone, 5.4% to a solar panel and 10.8% to a motorbike. While admitting the possibility that respondents may have inflated the variety and quantity of goods lost to the conflict (possibly with expectations of obtaining support), the reality is that this discrepancy supports the hypothesis that the displaced persons who reached the south of the province come from social groups with greater economic capacity.

## 4. ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION

### 4.1. Access to land and economic activities

One of the main difficulties faced by IDPs relates to access to means of production. In the destination place, they compete with the indigenous populations for access to land, firewood, charcoal, stakes and other natural resources. Largely deprived of capital, and without access to boats and fishing nets, vehicles and work tools, among other instruments of production, the displaced populations have found it extremely difficult to restart their economic activities. As Chart 10 shows, after the population resettlement, there was a clear decrease in economic activities carried out by the families, namely at the level of farming, livestock, fishing, commerce which were engaged in farming, livestock and fishing (particularly in Montepuez and Pemba). The only economic activity that registered an increase (although not significant<sup>11</sup>) was mining, in Montepuez district:

**Chart 10: Economic activities carried out by displaced populations, before and after the armed conflict (%)**




Access to land for production represents one of the most problematic issues and generates conflict. From the questionnaire survey applied in April 2021, there is a clear decrease in the areas cultivated by families in resettlement locations. If the overwhelming majority of the displaced persons surveyed cultivated, in their place of origin, areas greater than 1 hectare, the percentage of displaced persons who maintain this productive capacity is clearly lower (reaching only 4.5% in Mapupulo, Montepuez). The percentage of displaced persons who did not cultivate reaches 60.6% in Mapupulo and 34.3% in Marrupa (Chiúre) and Corrane (Meconta). Situated in an urban area of Pemba, the overwhelming majority (97.1%) of resettled people in Paquitequete neighbourhood did not have conditions for agricultural production (see Chart 11).

<sup>11</sup> During a focus group with 51 displaced persons in Mapupulo, after the application of questionnaires, a considerable group of participants (13 young people) mentioned that they used to travel regularly to Namanhumbir for the purpose of carrying out garimpo. These incursions were interrupted after the auscultation of gunfire in the illegal mining area. Traumatized by the war, the young people fled and interrupted the activity.




**Chart 11: Comparison of cultivated area in place of origin with the place of resettlement (%)**



The decrease in production was also observed at the level of livestock farming. In their place of origin, between 25.7% and 60% of households were goat farmers. After fleeing the war zone, only in Meconta was this activity observed, and it was only practised in a residual manner (7.1%). If in the place of origin, the vast majority (between 80% and 95.7%) were poultry or duck farmers, today, in the resettlement area, the percentage is considerably lower, especially in the town of Pemba (4.3%), in Montepuez (5.7%) and in Chiúre (14.3%). The data shows that the displaced persons in Meconta responded more quickly in terms of livestock farming than their counterparts in the other districts (see Chart 12)


**Chart 12: Percentage of households owning animals, at place of origin and place of resettlement**



The decrease in production was particularly evident at the level of fishing production, clearly affecting the population on the coast. As shown in Chart 13, among the Mwani ethnolinguistic group (who live predominantly on the coast), monthly fishing production above 80kg has reduced to residual values in the area today. With the exception of displaced persons from Muidumbe (where many used to fish in the Messalo River), the Makonde population has been comparatively less affected (see Chart 13). Strongly dependent on fishing and less familiar with agriculture, the

Mwani population faced greater integration problems in their places of destination, in a scenario where most of the support was destined for agricultural activities, to the detriment of fishing.

**Chart 13: Average monthly fishing production of displaced persons, by ethnic group, before and after resettlement (in kg)**



In all locations, land conflicts between natives and displaced persons were identified. In Corrane (Meconta) there are numerous reports of the Government handing over land to the displaced persons, allegedly without consultation with or compensation for the native populations who, in the face of the avalanche of displaced persons, appear to be claiming their land. If those who arrived throughout the last quarter of 2020 were able to access land, from mid-2021, the same land began to be claimed by the native populations, under the allegation that the loan term had ended. Between the months of June and August 2021 stories proliferated of displaced families prevented from cultivating on the agricultural land they had obtained months earlier, forcing neighbourhood secretaries to intervene, but generally without solution. In September 2020, some displaced families were evicted from their land after preparing it for production.

Similarly, in Montepuez, the native populations were reluctant to cede land, forcing successive interventions by the district government, generally without solution. Access to land was generally achieved in areas of less than one hectare per household, insufficient to guarantee food security throughout the year. The few displaced persons who did access land were only able to do so in very distant areas (more than three hours away), or in heavily forested areas, without axes and machetes for clearing, and encountering insects that affected production.

In Pemba, the families who were not sent to displacement centres in Ancuabe, Chiúre or Balama (a process that slowed down from April 2021, with the end of the agricultural season) remained without land for production. Displaced persons with greater economic power created their own small businesses, with a significant increase in M-pesa agents and moto-taxi drivers, fuelling speculation of links between these activities and the insurgency. Other displaced persons have started small activities selling mandaze<sup>12</sup>, bananas, credit, among other products.

Throughout the second half of 2021, the difficulty to access land remained a reality for most displaced persons, in all districts involved in the study. In this scenario, a land market (buying or renting) was formed, generally driven by families with greater resources, among which stand out civil servants or pensioners (former combatants of the national liberation struggle). The prices charged per hectare of land were said to be between 500 and 10,000 meticaís, for use in one

<sup>12</sup> Cake similar to arrufadas, made with wheat and sugar

agricultural campaign. In the north of the province, in Muidumbe district, land for production was rented for between 2,500 and 5,000 meticais per year<sup>13</sup>, for plots equivalent to about one hectare.

In all surveyed centres for displaced persons, most families tried to cultivate small vegetable gardens around their homes, mitigating food insecurity. As of mid-2021, if the families who arrived the longest in the centres for displaced persons timidly initiated some economic activities (small stalls where they sell some agricultural surplus, homemade drinks or mandaze, salt, soap, firewood or charcoal, clothes, sometimes hairdressing salons running on solar panels, M-pesa agent or transport business to the district headquarters), the reality is that among the majority of the displaced persons inactivity and heavy dependence on donations predominate, especially among the new arrivals. The lack of space for cultivation was generating a strong sense of anxiety, especially from the last quarter of 2021, when World Food Programme aid decreased.

In the northern region, in areas relatively less affected by the conflict, namely in the districts of Muidumbe and Nangade, populations continued to carry out agricultural activities, essentially subsistence, livestock farming, fishing (in rivers and lakes), firewood and charcoal extraction. A small number of traders continued to buy processed foods in Mueda and resell in small stalls in Miteda in Muidumbe. The quantity of available products decreased and prices increased significantly<sup>14</sup>. Due to the insecurity on the ground, the shops started to close much earlier.

In the north, situations of land conflict have not ceased, particularly since the last quarter of 2021, when individuals who had previously been refugees in Mueda or further south in the province have returned. Local individuals had sold plots of land without consulting the remaining family members, often absent from the region, who later came to demand monetary values.

#### **4.2. Access to inputs and extension support**


Throughout the first half of 2021, there was an intense campaign for distribution of agricultural inputs, either by FAO and local non-governmental organizations (such as Caritas or World Vision) or even, less frequently, by the Government of Mozambique (through ADIN and INGD). Chart 14 shows that the armed conflict caused a rupture in the scarce mechanisms for financing and supporting economic activities (access to bank credit or to the District Development Fund). On the other hand, migration, population dispersion and the interruption of economic activities decapitalized families, destroying informal support mechanisms, such as rotating savings and family loans. These mechanisms were replaced by more assistance-oriented support, and new actors came into play, including the INGD, non-governmental organisations and religious organisations.

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<sup>13</sup> As the lease is only for 12 months, the cultivation of cassava is prohibited in the agreement established between the owners of the land and the lessee

<sup>14</sup> For example, 1kg of rice, which before the conflict cost 40 meticais, in mid-2021 cost 60 meticais in a small stall in Miteda.

**Chart 14: Percentage of families with access to support at origin and destination**



Despite wider distribution of inputs by donors (in the most organised resettlement centres), the reality is that support was not sufficient for the size of the displaced population. There were problems of access to seeds, machetes and hoes, sometimes distributed too late. The supply of this support decreased considerably with the end of the rains, having only managed to mitigate situations of food insecurity, with a residual impact on the creation of surpluses and dynamization of small rural commerce. Due to the destruction of infrastructure and the fleeing of technicians from the district economic activities services, input support in the north of the province was practically non-existent.

While displaced populations from areas in the interior of the province were more familiar with agricultural activity and maize production, many populations from coastal areas (where fishing, commerce and maritime transport were their main activities) or from urban centres (living off the provision of services) did not have the same knowledge, skills and experience in agriculture. Without extension support, there are numerous reports of people returning to coastal areas, namely to the islands of Ibo or Matemo, to take up fishing activities.

## 5. SAFETY AND THE EXERCISE OF CITIZENSHIP

Despite the improved security conditions in the resettlement area, numerous situations of tension with the defence and security forces have not ceased to occur. One of the main reasons for conflicts arose from the lack of documents among the displaced population. A diagnosis carried out by the Catholic University of Mozambique (UCM) found that around 45% of the IDPs had no civil documentation, either because they had been burnt, left behind during the fleeing, or had never been issued (OMR, 2021). The absence of documentation placed the population in a very vulnerable position vis-à-vis law enforcement agents, known locally for their mistrust of displaced populations (particularly Muslims from the coast), for opportunism and extortion of monetary values or violence against civilians, including sexual<sup>15</sup> (DW, 26.10.2021). Young people returning to their places of origin in Palma were forced to pay monetary values to the military, inflating transport<sup>16</sup> costs.

<sup>15</sup> These abuses committed by defence and security forces have even been reported to the Public Prosecutor's Office (DW, 26.10.2021)


<sup>16</sup> A trip from Palma to Nangade which, in 2010, cost 250 meticaï, by the end of 2021, would cost 2,500 meticaï. The amount was paid to the driver, who was then forced to share half the value with Mozambican soldiers. Reports state that the Rwandan troops protested against these practices, which they tried to reduce.

The absence of a birth certificate had a negative impact on access to various citizenship rights, including access to other documentation (identity cards, DUATs, among others); social protection (vulnerability to kidnapping, organ and human trafficking, slave labour, etc.), invisibility and social exclusion. Seeking to respond to this need, the UCM carried out a legal caravan, with a view to providing the regularisation of the documental situation of displaced populations and promoting legal and judicial assistance. The issuing of tens of thousands of identity documents was an important relief for the displaced populations.

In all resettlement centres surveyed, there was a concern to identify or elect local leaders from among the displaced population, and to interact with the leaders of the pre-existing populations, in liaison with the head of post. With a view to promote interethnic relations and national unity, in Marrupa (Chiúre) there was a concern to mix the populations according to the ethnolinguistic group to which they belonged.


Questioned about the frequency of community meetings held, before and after the resettlement process, the vast majority - especially respondents in Mapupulo (Pemba), as well as Corrane (Meconta) and Paquitequete (Pemba) - reported the existence of frequent community meetings in the places of origin (in a monthly scale), generally related to the ongoing conflict and the need to promote the security of the populations. According to the respondents, the frequency of meetings intensified in the place of resettlement, this time focusing on humanitarian aid.

**Chart 15: Comparison of the frequency of community meetings, in place of origin and place of resettlement (%)**



Despite the frequency of meetings, in most cases participation is low, with a tendency to decrease with the resettlement process. If we observe Chart 16, we confirm that more than 80% of the displaced in Mapupulo (Montepuez) and Corrane (Meconta), more than two thirds of those resettled in the Paquitequete neighbourhood (in Pemba) and more than half of the residents in Marrupa (Chiúre) declared that they never participate in meetings or are not even invited.


**Chart 16: Comparison of the frequency of presentation of opinion during community meetings, in place of origin and place of resettlement (%)**



## 6. PROSPECTS OF RETURN

When questioned about their perspectives for the future (by the end of the year, what are your family's plans?), the respondents' answers varied between "the entire family returning to the place of origin" - particularly in Montepuez (60%) and Chiure (50%) - and remaining with the family in the place of resettlement, mainly in Meconta (80%), as well as in the city of Pemba (39.1%). The data shows that those who intend to return distinguish themselves from the others by holding larger areas of land in the places of origin. On the other hand, those who moved to more distant areas (namely to Nampula province) showed greater reluctance to return during the year 2021.

**Chart 17: Prospects of the population in relation to the future (%)**



From June 2021, with the entry into action of the Rwandan armed forces, a new phase of the conflict was witnessed. The media reported the intensification of maritime surveillance, as well as pursuit actions against the rebels. The victorious news in the media - highlighting the capture of Mocímboa da Praia, the capture of bases and insurgent leaders, including numerous weapons - created a sense of increased security, fuelling expectations that some displaced persons would return. The absence of land for cultivation and jobs in the centres for displaced persons, as well

as the interruption of humanitarian aid, discouraged people from remaining in the resettlement places. Anticipating the first rains and aware of the need to prepare the cultivation fields, the last quarter of 2021 witnessed efforts by many displaced persons to process the necessary documentation to initiate return movements (Cabo Ligado, 15.10.2021) - namely from Pemba and Metuge (generally for Quissanga and Macomia districts) and Montepuez (mainly for Mueda and Muidumbe) -, although without express permission from the authorities.

Displaced persons found most of their houses destroyed, burnt and/or looted. People have become involved in agriculture, in anticipation of the rainy season, while others have returned to fishing, with not many other work alternatives available. According to an ACLED estimate (Cabo Ligado, 15.10.2021), some 30,000 people have returned to their homes in Palma town alone in recent weeks, from both neighbouring Quitunda and Pemba.

If in Palma the concentration of civilians in the area of Rwandan presence allows for a climate of security, the greater dispersion of the population in the districts of Nangade, Muidumbe and Macomia has increased the challenges of protecting civilians, making them once again vulnerable to attacks by armed groups, lacking logistical supplies. In fact, throughout October and November, there were attacks south of the Messalo River in Muidumbe, Nangade and Mueda districts, generating further population displacement. In November 2021, at the Metuge centres for displaced persons, there were contradictory population movements: people seeking to return to their places of origin crossed paths with others returning, some experiencing displacement for the first time. This dubious situation increased the uncertainty of the populations.

Aware that they were the preferred targets of the insurgent group's anger, many civil servants remained fearful, considering returning only at the beginning of the school year (Cabo Ligado, 15.10.2021). In reality, the populations anticipated the government bodies, even though they lacked infrastructure for health and education, banking or support for economic activities.

## **FINAL CONSIDERATIONS**

With the beginning of the armed conflict, a province that had high levels of multidimensional poverty and access to services experienced a worsening of the living conditions of the populations. Despite all the efforts to drill boreholes for water and provide sanitation, the truth is that these were insufficient to meet the needs of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, and thousands of cases of cholera and diarrhoea also occurred. In the south of the province there has been a saturation of health and education services and displaced populations have experienced setbacks in terms of access to energy. Resettled nearby or even in urban areas, the increased proximity to health and education infrastructures and services did not translate into improved access to these services, but only to their saturation. The war, forced displacement and the COVID-19 prevention measures had a deep negative impact on access to education, affecting hundreds of thousands of young people and compromising the socio-professional integration of an entire generation. The reproduction and worsening of poverty phenomena will increase the potential for young people to join violent and radical groups.

The safest places in the south of the province (and at the same time further away from the conflict zones) constituted the point of refuge for populations with the greatest range of contacts and financial power to sponsor family travel. Among these individuals, it was possible to observe the over-representation of civil servants, pensioners, small entrepreneurs or employees, and family members of individuals with greater economic capacity and accumulated savings. Conversely, the most socially vulnerable tended to remain in centres of displacement closer to insecure areas

(more crowded and with less capacity to access resources) or even in the conflict zones themselves, with limited access to public services and, for much of the year, deprived of access to humanitarian aid.

Due to the greater security conditions and the greater ease with which it is easier to obtain travel permits, the south of the province has particularly benefited from international aid. A great effort was made by the United Nations in terms of access to water and sanitation, hygiene and food aid, taking the place of the State and ensuring the survival of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons.

Limited in assisting displaced populations in the most militarily insecure areas during the first half of 2020, humanitarian aid ended up reproducing social inequalities by providing access to goods and services to families with more resources. The installation of the entire humanitarian industry in the cities in the south of the Province (in Pemba, as well as Montepuez), revitalised economic sectors affected by the interruption of extractive projects, such as hotels and restaurants, rental of villas and warehouses, freight transport and rent-a-car, revitalising local content and employing hundreds of local youth.

The opportunism that accompanied the process of distributing food vouchers did not fail to mitigate the vulnerability of non-displaced families, who were also affected by the interruption of commercial channels in the province, the destruction of Cyclone Kenneth or the effects of the COVID-19 prevention measures. Although it also generated injustice and deprivation among those most in need, the opportunism that occurred in access to humanitarian aid allowed surpluses to be generated, providing a timid economic recovery.

The displacement of hundreds of thousands of individuals to the south of the province increased the pressure on natural resources (agricultural land, stakes for construction, firewood and charcoal, hunting and mining), thus increasing tensions with local populations. Difficulties in accessing agricultural land, decapitalization, the absence of means of production, uncertainty about the future and the breakdown of informal solidarity networks (with separated and decapitalized families) have prevented the recovery and generation of new economic activities. The support focused mainly on the assistance aspect (the provision of food and basic services) and not so much on the supply of inputs, credit or financial training, with a view to supporting the productive system. The actions were mainly palliative, aimed at reducing the suffering of the populations and not so much at promoting holistic, coherent and integrated development policies.

The incoherence of the intervention policies was particularly visible in the second half of 2021, when international troops intervened and counter-terrorism actions intensified, without measures to facilitate access to land for the population, which coincided with the most difficult period for the WFP to provide food aid. With no access to land and food deprivation, idling and guessing at the onset of rains and hearing news of greater military security, many displaced persons anticipated government bodies and returned to their areas of origin, without access to public services or inputs.

The hasty return of large numbers of civilians to the districts of Muidumbe, Nangade, Macomia, Quissanga and Ancuabe provided an opportunity for the insurgency to avoid confrontation with the more effective international forces (notably Rwandans, concentrated in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia) by spreading out in small groups and attacking isolated villages, accessing food and abducting civilians. The early return of displaced persons to their places of origin constituted a breathing space for the military insurgency, reigniting the conflict.



The evidence shows that, in a scenario of great social vulnerability, the distribution of humanitarian aid, namely medical and food aid, plays a central role in stabilizing the conflict. Situations of inequality, injustice and food deprivation in the districts of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia had already been a motivation for many local young people to join the insurgent group, not necessarily for ideological reasons, but because they found greater opportunities for survival in this option (Feijó, 2021).

On the other hand, throughout 2021, the intention of the Government regarding the displaced populations was not always clear. Centrally issued appeals to wait for instructions from the armed forces to return contrasted with the mobilisation of the populations by local leaders for their return, or with the inexistence of local government actions to provide displaced populations with access to land, guaranteeing the rights of the indigenous populations.

All this disagreement generated confusion among the actors on the ground, who never understood whether they were in a phase of humanitarian aid or moving towards stabilization, skipping steps in the process, leading to less sustainable solutions in the future.

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126	Terra da abundância, terra da miséria. Usurpação sinérgica de recursos em Massingir	Natacha Bruna	Junho de 2022
125	Terra da abundância, terra da miséria. Usurpação sinérgica de recursos em Massingir	Natacha Bruna	Junho de 2022
124	<b>Dinâmicas na produção agrícola no vale do limpopo: o caso do arroz</b>	<b>Nelson Capaina</b>	<b>Maião de 2022</b>
123	Efeitos das mudanças climáticas nos sistemas de produção em Moçambique: Implicações para a segurança alimentar	Máriam Abbas	Abril de 2022
122	Evolução dos Preços dos Bens Alimentares (2021)	<b>Yara Nova e Jonas Mbiza</b>	<b>Março de 2022</b>
121	<b>Ingredientes para uma revolta de jovens - Pobreza, sociedade de consumo e expectativas frustradas</b>	João Feijó, Jerry Maquenzi e Aleia Rachide Agy	<b>Fevereiro de 2022</b>
120	Caminhos para a segurança alimentar em moçambique: Uma abordagem de sistemas de produção	Máriam Abbas	Janeiro de 2022
119	<b>A configuração da estrutura económica de Manica e Sofala e processos de resistência à colonização</b>	<b>Janete Cravino</b>	<b>Julho de 2021</b>
118	Caracterização socioeconómica da zona centro de Moçambique. Enfoque no corredor da Beira	João Mosca	Julho de 2021
117	<b>Cobertura Florestal em Moçambique</b>	<b>Mélica Chandamela</b>	<b>Julho de 2021</b>
116	Processos administrativos e práticas na titulação da terra em Moçambique: O caso dos municípios de Maputo e Matola	Nelson Capaina	Junho de 2021
115	<b>Mudanças nos padrões tradicionais de exploração da terra e do trabalho: O caso da açucareira de Xinavane</b>	<b>Joana Manuel Matusse Joaquim, João Mosca, Ana Sampaio</b>	<b>Junho de 2021</b>
114	O papel das mulheres no conflito em Cabo delgado: entendendo ciclos viciosos da violência	João Feijó	Maião de 2021
113	<b>Pobreza e desigualdades em Moçambique: um estudo de caso em seis distritos</b>	<b>Jerry Maquenzi</b>	<b>Maião de 2021</b>
112	Os determinantes do desmatamento em moçambique: uma abordagem econométrica para o período de 2000-2016	Ibraimo Hassane Mussagy, João Mosca, Mélica Chandamela e Natasha Ribeiro	Maião de 2021
111	<b>Des(continuidades) políticas e económicas de longa duração do sector familiar (camponeses) em moçambique</b>	<b>João Mosca</b>	<b>Abril de 2021</b>
110	Política Monetária do Banco de Moçambique: Qual É O Gato Escondido?	João Mosca	Abril de 2021
109	<b>Caracterização e organização social dos machababos a Partir de discursos de Mulheres raptadas</b>	<b>João Feijó</b>	<b>Abril de 2021</b>
108	Moçambique e a Importação do Carapau: Um desafio sem Alternativas (!)	Nelson Capaina	Março de 2021
107	<b>Por Uma política Monetária Ajustada à Economia Real em Contexto de Crise: Humanidade e Sabedoria</b>	<b>Fáusio Mussá, Roberto Tibana, Inocência Mussipe Coordenador: João Mosca</b>	<b>Março de 2021</b>
106	Comércio Externo e crescimento económico em Moçambique	João Mosca, Yasser Arafat Dadá e Yulla Marques	Março de 2021
105	<b>Macroeconomia das pescas em Moçambique</b>	<b>Nelson Capaina</b>	<b>Fevereiro de 2021</b>
104	Influência de factores institucionais no desempenho do sector agrário em Moçambique	João Carrilho e Rui Ribeiro	Fevereiro de 2021
103	<b>Evolução de preços e bens alimentares em 2020</b>	<b>Yulla Marques e Jonas Mbiza</b>	<b>Fevereiro de 2021</b>
102	<b>Contributo para o planeamento e Desenvolvimento de Cabo Delgado</b>	<b>João Mosca e Jerry Maquenzi</b>	<b>Fevereiro de 2021</b>
101	Desenvolvimento socioeconómico de Cabo Delgado num contexto de conflito	João Feijó, António Souto e Jerry Maquenzi	Fevereiro de 2021
100	<b>Caracterização do sector das pescas em Moçambique</b>	<b>Nelson Capaina</b>	<b>Janeiro de 2021</b>
99	Dificuldades de Realização de Pesquisa em Moçambique	João Feijó	Setembro de 2020
98	<b>Análise de conjuntura económica 2º trimestre de 2020</b>	<b>João Mosca</b>	<b>Setembro de 2020</b>
97	Género e desenvolvimento: Factores para o empoderamento da mulher rural	Aleia Rachide Agy	Agosto de 2020
96	<b>Micro-simulações dos impactos da COVID-19 na pobreza e desigualdade em Moçambique</b>	<b>Ibraimo Hassane Mussagy e João Mosca</b>	<b>Julho de 2020</b>
95	Contributo para um debate necessário da política fiscal em Moçambique	João Mosca e Rabia Aiuba	Junho de 2020
94	<b>Economia de Moçambique: Análise de conjuntura pré COVID-19</b>	<b>João Mosca e Rabia Aiuba</b>	<b>Junho de 2020</b>
93	Assimetrias no acesso ao Estado: Um terreno fértil de penetração do jihadismo islâmico	João Feijó	Junho de 2020
92	<b>Implementação das medidas de prevenção do COVID-19: Uma avaliação intercalar nas cidades de Maputo, Beira e Nampula</b>	<b>João Feijó e Ibraimo Hassane Mussagy</b>	<b>Junho de 2020</b>
91	Secundarização da agricultura e persistência da pobreza rural: Reprodução de cidadanias desiguais	João Feijó	Maião de 2020
90	<b>Transição florestal: Estudo socioeconómico do desmatamento em Nhamatanda</b>	<b>Mélica Chandamela</b>	<b>Abril de 2020</b>
89	Produção bovina em Moçambique: Desafios e perspectivas – O caso da província de Maputo	Nelson Capaina	Março de 2020
88	<b>Avaliação dos impactos dos investimentos nas plantações florestais da Portuzel-Moçambique na província da Zambézia</b>	<b>Almeida Siteo e Sá Nogueira Lisboa</b>	<b>Março de 2020</b>
87	Terra e crises climáticas: percepções de populações deslocadas pelo ciclone IDAI no distrito de Nhamatanda	Uacitissa Mandamule	Fevereiro de 2020
86	<b>“senhor, passar para onde?” Estrutura fundiária e mapeamento de conflitos de terra no distrito de Nhamatanda</b>	<b>Uacitissa Mandamule</b>	<b>Fevereiro de 2020</b>
85	Evolução dos preços dos bens essenciais de consumo em 2019	Rabia Aiuba e Jonas Mbiza	Fevereiro de 2020

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84	<b>Repensar a segurança alimentar e nutricional: Alterações no sistema agro-alimentar e o direito à alimentação em Moçambique</b>	<b>Refiloe Joala, Máriam Abbas, Lázaro dos Santos, Natacha Bruna, Carlos Serra, e Natacha Ribeiro</b>	<b>Janeiro de 2020</b>
83	Pobreza no meio rural: Situação de famílias monoparentais chefiadas por mulheres	Aleia Rachide Agy	Janeiro de 2020
82	<b>Ascensão e queda do PROSAVANA: Da cooperação triangular à cooperação bilateral contra-resistência / The rise and fall of PROSAVANA: From triangular cooperation to bilateral cooperation in counter-resistance</b>	<b>Sayaka Funada-Classen</b>	<b>Dezembro de 2019</b>
81	Investimento público na agricultura: O caso dos centros de prestação de serviços agrários; complexo de silos da bolsa de mercadorias de Moçambique e dos regadios	Yasser Arafat Dadá, Yara Nova e Cerina Mussá	Novembro de 2019
80	<b>Agricultura: Assim, não é possível reduzir a pobreza em Moçambique</b>	<b>João Mosca e Yara Nova</b>	<b>Outubro de 2019</b>
79	Corredores de desenvolvimento: Reestruturação produtiva ou continuidade histórica. O caso do corredor da Beira, Moçambique	Rabia Aiuba	Setembro de 2019
78	<b>Condições socioeconómicas das mulheres associadas na província de Nampula: Estudos de caso nos distritos de Malema, Ribaué e Monapo</b>	<b>Aleia Rachide Agy</b>	Agosto de 2019
77	Pobreza e desigualdades em zonas de penetração de grandes projectos: Estudo de caso em Namanhumbir - Cabo Delgado	Jerry Maquenzi	Agosto de 2019
76	<b>Pobreza, desigualdades e conflitos no norte de Cabo Delgado</b>	<b>Jerry Maquenzi e João Feijó</b>	<b>Julho de 2019</b>
75	A maldição dos recursos naturais: Mineração artesanal e conflitualidade em Namanhumbir	Jerry Maquenzi e João Feijó	Junho de 2019
74	<b>Agricultura em números: Análise do orçamento do estado, investimento, crédito e balança comercial</b>	<b>Yara Nova, Yasser Arafat Dadá e Cerina Mussá</b>	<b>Maio de 2019</b>
73	Titulação e subaproveitamento da terra em Moçambique: Algumas causas e implicações	Nelson Capaina	Abril de 2019
72	<b>Os mercados de terras rurais no corredor da Beira: tipos, dinâmicas e conflitos.</b>	<b>Uacitissa Mandamule e Tomás Manhicane</b>	<b>Março de 2019</b>
71	Evolução dos preços dos bens alimentares 2018	Yara Nova	Fevereiro de 2019
70	<b>A economia política do Corredor da Beira: Consolidação de um enclave ao serviço do Hinterland</b>	<b>Thomas Selemane</b>	<b>Janeiro de 2019</b>
69	Indicadores de Moçambique, da África subsaariana e do mundo	Rabia Aiuba e Yara Nova	Dezembro de 2018
68	Médios produtores comerciais no corredor da beira: dimensão do fenómeno e caracterização	João Feijó Yasser Arafat Dadá	<b>Novembro de 2018</b>
67	<b>Polos de crescimento e os efeitos sobre a pequena produção: O caso de Nacala-porto</b>	<b>Yasser Arafat Dadá e Yara Nova</b>	<b>Outubro de 2018</b>
66	Os Sistemas Agro-Alimentares no Mundo e em Moçambique	Rabia Aiuba	Setembro de 2018
65	Agro-negócio e campesinato. Continuidade e descontinuidade de Longa Duração. O Caso de Moçambique.	João Mosca	Agosto de 2018
64	<b>Determinantes da Indústria Têxtil e de vestuário em Moçambique (1960-2014)</b>	<b>Cerina Mussá e Yasser Dadá</b>	<b>Julho de 2018</b>
63	Participação das mulheres em projectos de investimento agrário no Distrito de Monapo	Aleia Rachide Agy	Junho de 2018
62	<b>Chokwé: efeitos locais de políticas Instáveis, erráticas e contraditórias</b>	<b>Máiriam Abbas</b>	<b>Maio de 2018</b>
61	Pobreza, diferenciação social e (des) alianças políticas no meio rural	João Feijó	Abril de 2018
60	<b>Evolução dos Preços de Bens alimentares e Serviços 2017</b>	<b>Yara Nova</b>	<b>Março de 2018</b>
59	Estruturas de Mercado e sua influência na formação dos preços dos produtos agrícolas ao longo das suas cadeias de valor	Yara Pedro Nova	Fevereiro de 2018
58	<b>Avaliação dos impactos dos investimentos das plantações florestais da Portucel-Moçambique nas tecnologias agrícolas das populações locais nos distritos de Ile e Namarrói, Província da Zambézia</b>	<b>Almeida Siteo e Sá Nogueira Lisboa</b>	<b>Novembro de 2017</b>
57	<b>Desenvolvimento Rural em Moçambique: Discursos e Realidades – Um estudo de caso do distrito de Pebane, Província da Zambézia</b>	<b>Nelson Capaina</b>	<b>Outubro de 2017</b>
56	A Economia política do corredor de Nacala: Consolidação do padrão de economia extrovertida em Moçambique	Thomas Selemane	Setembro de 2017
55	<b>Segurança Alimentar Auto-suficiência alimentar: Mito ou verdade?</b>	<b>Máiriam Abbas</b>	<b>Agosto de 2017</b>
54	A inflação e a produção agrícola em Moçambique	Soraya Fenita e Máiriam Abbas	Julho de 2017
53	<b>Plantações florestais e a instrumentalização do estado em Moçambique</b>	<b>Natacha Bruna</b>	<b>Junho de 2017</b>
52	Sofala: Desenvolvimento e Desigualdades Territoriais	Yara Pedro Nova	Junho de 2017
51	<b>Estratégia de produção camponesa em Moçambique: estudo de caso no sul do Save - Chókwe, Guijá e KaMavota</b>	<b>Yasser Arafat Dadá</b>	<b>Maio de 2017</b>
50	Género e relações de poder na região sul de Moçambique – uma análise sobre a localidade de Mucotuene na província de Gaza	Aleia Rachide Agy	Abril de 2017
49	<b>Criando capacidades para o desenvolvimento: o género no acesso aos recursos produtivos no meio rural em Moçambique</b>	<b>Nelson Capaina</b>	<b>Março de 2017</b>
48	Perfil socio-económico dos pequenos agricultores do sul de Moçambique: realidades de Chókwe, Guijá e KaMavota	Momade Ibraimo	Março de 2017
47	Agricultura, diversificação e Transformação estrutural da economia	João Mosca	Fevereiro de 2017
46	<b>Processos e debates relacionados com DUATs. Estudos de caso em Nampula e Zambézia.</b>	<b>Uacitissa Mandamule</b>	<b>Novembro de 2016</b>
45	Tete e Cateme: entre a implosão do el dorado e a contínua degradação das condições de	Thomas Selemane	Outubro de 2016
44	<b>Investimentos, assimetrias e movimentos de protesto na província de Tete</b>	<b>João Feijó</b>	<b>Setembro de 2016</b>
43	Motivações migratórias rural-urbanas e perspectivas de regresso ao campo – uma análise do desenvolvimento rural em moçambique a partir de Maputo	João Feijó e Aleia Rachide Agy e Momade Ibraimo	Agosto de 2016
42	<b>Políticas públicas e desigualdades sociais e territoriais em Moçambique</b>	<b>João Mosca e Máiriam Abbas</b>	Julho de 2016

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41	Metodologia de estudo dos impactos dos megaprojectos	João Mosca e Natacha Bruna	Junho de 2016
<b>40</b>	<b>Cadeias de valor e ambiente de negócios na agricultura em Moçambique</b>	<b>Mota Lopes</b>	<b>Maio de 2016</b>
39	Zambézia: Rica e Empobrecida	João Mosca e Yara Nova	Abril de 2016
<b>38</b>	<b>Exploração artesanal de ouro em Manica</b>	<b>António Júnior, Momade Ibraimo e João Mosca</b>	<b>Março de 2016</b>
37	Tipologia dos conflitos sobre ocupação da terra em Moçambique	Uacitissa Mandamule	Fevereiro de 2016
<b>36</b>	<b>Políticas públicas e agricultura</b>	<b>João Mosca e Máriam Abbas</b>	<b>Janeiro de 2016</b>
35	Pardais da china, jatrofa e tractores de Moçambique: remédios que não prestam para o desenvolvimento rural	Luis Artur	Dezembro de 2015
<b>34</b>	<b>A política monetária e a agricultura em Moçambique</b>	<b>Máriam Abbas</b>	<b>Novembro de 2015</b>
33	A influência do estado de saúde da população na produção agrícola em Moçambique	Luis Artur e Arsénio Jorge	Outubro de 2015
<b>32</b>	<b>Discursos à volta do regime de propriedade da terra em Moçambique</b>	<b>Uacitissa Mandamule</b>	<b>Setembro de 2015</b>
31	Prosavana: discursos, práticas e realidades	João Mosca e Natacha Bruna	Agosto de 2015
<b>30</b>	<b>Do modo de vida camponês à pluriactividade impacto do assalariamento urbano na economia familiar rural</b>	<b>João Feijó e Aleia Rachide</b>	<b>Julho de 2015</b>
29	Educação e produção agrícola em Moçambique: o caso do milho	Natacha Bruna	Junho de 2015
<b>28</b>	<b>Legislação sobre os recursos naturais em Moçambique: convergências e conflitos na relação com a terra</b>	<b>Eduardo Chiziane</b>	<b>Maio de 2015</b>
27	Relações Transfronteiriças de Moçambique	António Júnior, Yasser Arafat Dadá e João Mosca	Abril de 2015
<b>26</b>	<b>Macroeconomia e a produção agrícola em Moçambique</b>	<b>Máriam Abbas</b>	<b>Abril de 2015</b>
25	Entre discurso e prática: dinâmicas locais no acesso aos fundos de desenvolvimento distrital em Mombaça	Nelson Capaina	Março de 2015
<b>24</b>	<b>Agricultura familiar em Moçambique: Ideologias e Políticas</b>	<b>João Mosca</b>	<b>Fevereiro de 2015</b>
23	Transportes públicos rodoviários na cidade de Maputo: entre os TPM e os My Love	Kayola da Barca Vieira Yasser Arafat Dadá e Margarida Martins	Dezembro de 2014
<b>22</b>	<b>Lei de Terras: Entre a Lei e as Práticas na defesa de Direitos sobre a terra</b>	<b>Eduardo Chiziane</b>	<b>Novembro de 2014</b>
21	Associações de pequenos produtores do sul de Moçambique: constrangimentos e desafios	António Júnior, Yasser Arafat Dadá e João Mosca	Outubro de 2014
<b>20</b>	<b>Influência das taxas de câmbio na agricultura</b>	<b>João Mosca, Yasser Arafat Dadá e Kátia Amreén Pereira</b>	<b>Setembro de 2014</b>
19	Competitividade do Algodão Em Moçambique	Natacha Bruna	Agosto de 2014
<b>18</b>	<b>O Impacto da Exploração Florestal no Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Locais nas Áreas de Exploração dos Recursos Faunísticos na Província de Nampula</b>	<b>Carlos Manuel Serra, António Cuna, Assane Amade e Félix Goia</b>	<b>Julho de 2014</b>
17	Competitividade do subsector do caju em Moçambique	Máriam Abbas	Junho de 2014
<b>16</b>	<b>Mercantilização do gado bovino no distrito de Chicualacuala</b>	<b>António Manuel Júnior</b>	<b>Maio de 2014</b>
15	Os efeitos do HIV e SIDA no sector agrário e no bem-estar nas províncias de Tete e Niassa	Luis Artur, Ussene Buleza, Mateus Marassiro, Garcia Júnior	Abril de 2015
<b>14</b>	<b>Investimento no sector agrário</b>	<b>João Mosca e Yasser Arafat Dadá</b>	<b>Março de 2014</b>
13	Subsídios à Agricultura	João Mosca, Kátia Amreén Pereira e Yasser Arafat Dadá	Fevereiro de 2014
<b>12</b>	<b>Anatomia Pós-Fukushima dos Estudos sobre o ProSAVANA: Focalizando no "Os mitos por trás do ProSavana" de Natalia Fingeremann</b>	<b>Sayaka Funada-Classen</b>	<b>Dezembro de 2013</b>
11	Crédito Agrário	João Mosca, Natacha Bruna, Katia Amreén Pereira e Yasser Arafat Dadá	Novembro de 2013
<b>10</b>	<b>Shallow roots of local development or branching out for new opportunities: how local communities in Mozambique may benefit from investments in land and forestry Exploitation</b>	<b>Emelie Blomgren &amp; Jessica Lindkvist</b>	<b>Setembro de 2013</b>
9	Orçamento do estado para a agricultura	Américo Izaltino Casamo, João Mosca e Yasser Arafat	Setembro de 2013
<b>8</b>	<b>Agricultural Intensification in Mozambique. Opportunities and Obstacles—Lessons from Ten Villages</b>	<b>Peter E. Coughlin, Nícia Givá</b>	<b>Julho de 2013</b>
7	Agro-Negócio em Nampula: casos e expectativas do ProSAVANA	Dipac Jaiential	Junho de 2013
<b>6</b>	<b>Estrangeirização da terra, agronegócio e campesinato no Brasil e em Moçambique</b>	<b>Elizabeth Alice Clements e Bernardo Mançano Fernandes</b>	<b>Maio de 2013</b>
5	Contributo para o estudo dos determinantes da produção agrícola	João Mosca e Yasser Arafat Dadá	Abril de 2013
<b>4</b>	<b>Algumas dinâmicas estruturais do sector agrário.</b>	<b>João Mosca, Vitor Matavel e Yasser Arafat Dadá</b>	<b>Março de 2013</b>
3	Preços e mercados de produtos agrícolas alimentares.	João Mosca e Máriam Abbas	Janeiro de 2013
<b>2</b>	<b>Balança Comercial Agrícola: Para uma estratégia de substituição de importações?</b>	<b>João Mosca e Natacha Bruna</b>	<b>Novembro de 2012</b>
1	Porque é que a produção alimentar não é prioritária?	João Mosca	Setembro de 2012




The OMR is a civil society association whose general objective is to contribute to agrarian and rural development in an integrated and interdisciplinary perspective, through research, studies and debates on policies and other agrarian and rural development issues.

OMR focuses its actions on the pursuit of the following specific objectives:

- Promote and carry out studies and research on policies and other issues related to rural development;
- Disseminate research results and reflections;
- Make the results of the debates known to society, either through press releases or through the publication of texts;
- Create an updated bibliographic database, in digitized form;
- Establish relationships with national and international research institutions for the exchange of information and partnerships in specific research work on agrarian and rural development issues in Mozambique;
- Develop partnerships with higher education institutions to involve students in research according to the topics of analysis and discussion scheduled;
- Create conditions for editing the texts presented for OMR analysis and debate.

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